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The classic if somewhat controversial formula, La 
crise de la conscience européenne, as Paul Hazard put it 
in his groundbreaking book (Hazard, 1935), alludes to the 
long-term process of constructing and defining “con-
sciousness”. The relevance of this notion, therefore, is 
well beyond a simple allegorical effect of the book’s title, 
since the emergence of a distinctive type of individual 
consciousness has been identified frequently as one of the 
main features of the emergence of European Modernity. 
However, at the same time, Hazard masterfully demon-
strated the ambiguous and contradictory nature of that 
very notion. According to him, European Modernity is 
not only the expression of conciliatory and positive ideas 
but, also, a place for antagonizing and repressive views. 
Likewise, individual consciousness, as one of the central 
elements of this transformation, is not free from contra-
dictions and tensions. Modern consciousness or subjec-
tivity inhabits the distance between the interior and exte-
rior, between subject and object. This gap is the 
battleground for the conflict between the affirmation of 
modern disciplining techniques and the emergence of a 
particular form of subjectivity whose agency was per-
ceived as increasingly dangerous. This problematic or 
controversial context still exists as one of the fundamen-
tal obstacles to understanding how this emergence of 
modern subjectivity occurred.
Therefore, as a first step to unraveling the many con-
flicts underlying our understanding of this process, it is 
important to consider that the narratives regarding the 
emergence of modern subjectivity somehow reproduce 
the contradicting views of Modernity, as denounced by 
Hazard. First and foremost, narratives of modern subjec-
tivity are marked by the tension between the interpreta-
tion of Modernity as a universal phenomenon and the 
particular character of its historical experience1. A recur-
ring manifestation of this situation is the conflict between 
competing national or confessional narratives about the 
origins of modern subjectivity. It is common nowadays 
to situate the starting point of this controversy in the 
work of Max Weber. In his book The Protestant Ethic 
and the Spirit of Capitalism (1930), Weber argued that 
the Protestant -specifically Calvinist- form of spirituality 
was the basis for a progressive “disenchantment of the 
world”, the modern development of critical thinking and 
individuality that ultimately also led to the development 
of the capitalist system of production and economic rela-
tions 2. It is necessary to bear in mind, however, that We-
ber was not original in his delineation of the origins of 
modern subjectivity. In fact, he was adapting a long-
standing interpretation that situated Protestantism at the 
epicenter of modern rationalist and critical thinking, 
which can be traced back to early modern times and to 
the forefathers of that same intellectual genealogy3. It is 
revealing that replies to those claims can also be traced 
to that early date in the Catholic and, especially Spanish, 
context -as it was the case of the particularly difficult po-
sition of the novatores. This affirmation of the Catholic 
and Spanish role in the genealogy of modern thinking 
has continued ever since. Of special significance is the 
work of Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo who by the late 
nineteenth century, before Weber, suggested an alterna-
tive genealogy of modern thought, in his work De los 
orígenes del criticismo y del escepticismo y especial-
mente de los precursores españoles de Kant (Menéndez 
y Pelayo, 1891), showing the connections between early 
modern Iberian authors and modern philosophy. In the 
mid-twentieth century, José Antonio Maravall continued 
the discussion, debating the Iberian roots of the modern 
idea of progress as well as many other ideas connected to 
it, such as the praise of literary originality and a critical 
stance towards the authority of tradition (Maravall, 
1966). A particular version of this trend was also defend-
ed by Américo Castro who argued for the relevance of 
Iberian Jewish conversos in the development of modern 
thinking4. This position was more recently held by the 
late American historian of philosophy Richard Popkin, 
better known for his History of Scepticism, who was 
willing to demonstrate the Iberian roots of the revival of 
skepticism in the early modern period5.
The conflictual nature of these antagonizing narra-
tives, as well as their continuation since Early Modern 
times, suggests that we should bear in mind Hazard’s 
warnings over the extremely complex and pervasive na-
ture of that ambivalence in the process of Modernity -and 
the emergence of modern subjectivity. A process includ-
ing the affirmation of universal ideals constituted by the 
continuous affirmation of exceptionalism and particular 
identities. We should therefore be aware of the risk of rei-
fying the limits of this process according to strict cultural 
or confessional categories but, also, of forgetting that 
confessional and cultural considerations were (and are) 
part of its fabric. 
BEYOND THE CONfESSIONAL LIMITS  
Of MODERNITY? 
In recent years there has been an increasing effort to 
provide a meaningful description of the genealogy of Mo-
dernity which would overcome the conflicts of traditional 
narratives. These contributions seek to overcome the con-
fessional divide of previous antagonizing narratives of 
modernity by equalizing the relevance of each particular 
context -either Protestant or Catholic. Thus, the innova-
tive nature of Protestant spirituality has been downplayed, 
pointing to the existence of medieval and pre-Reforma-
tion precedents (Eire, 2016: 937-938). Other contribu-
tions have focused on the troubles caused by a definition 
of these processes within each particular confessional 
context in contrast to its opposite. In this regard, the still 
frequent view of the Catholic context as the inverse of the 
Reformed one -which includes the use of such notions as 
Catholic Reformation or Counter-Reformation- has been 
denounced. Instead, they suggest that both contexts were 
experiencing parallel processes of adaptation to the same 
transformations in the early modern era: the emergence of 
the modern state, the discovery of new worlds geographi-
cally and in print, and the re-writing of history6. This 
awareness has led to the increasing adoption of more in-
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clusive perceptions of the relation between these two con-
texts and new terms such as “Early Modern Catholicism” 
have been proposed to overcome the antagonist logic of 
previous categories (Bireley, 2007: 146).
This preoccupation over terminology, however, was 
deemed insufficient by Simon Ditchfield who considered 
it a secondary issue in comparison to the dilemmas posed 
by the descriptions of the complexity and dynamism of 
these processes behind the affirmation of Modern Cathol-
icism (Ditchfield, 2004). More recently, Ditchfield has 
argued for the need to animate the rigid vision of Early 
Modern Catholicism built on a monolithic image of the 
results and implications of the Council of Trent. While he 
similarly denounces this “confessio-centrism” in contrast 
to Protestantism in which this vision is construed, he also 
warns against the tendency to pre-determine this critique 
by imposing the narrative of “we too-ism”, as an answer 
to the search for a place for Catholicism in the emergence 
of the Modern World. Thus, he argues, the legitimate re-
sponse to “the curse of Max Weber” has led to the substi-
tution of the weberian teleology by yet another, this time 
inspired by a simplistic interpretation of Foucault’s ideas. 
To overcome this situation Ditchfield proposes an ap-
proach inspired by the work of Steven Shapin on the his-
tory of science, which tries to overcome the presentist 
and teleological narratives of modern scientific and philo-
sophical transformations through the contextualization 
and embodiment of these scientific and intellectual pro-
ductions. He defends that “‘Tridentine Catholicism’ needs 
to be understood less as an abstract noun […] but rather 
as a concrete verb” (Ditchfield, 2013).
What Ditchfield highlights is probably due to the still 
frequent overdetermination of the definition of early 
modern processes according to -or in contrast to- the we-
berian model -and the Confessionalization Thesis derived 
from the works of Heinz Schilling and Wolfgang Rein-
hard. An example of this situation in the realm of litera-
ture on modern interiority is the work of Wietse de Boer 
regarding the system of social discipline in Borromean 
Lombardy (Boer, 2001). While adopting a Foucaultian 
approach, De Boer traced the development of a system of 
social discipline through the generalization of confession 
and penance as instruments of surveillance and control by 
the Post-Tridentine church. De Boer favored a vision of a 
conscious and instrumental reason -ostensibly champi-
oned by the Borromean archbishops- behind the emer-
gence of these practices. The problem with this interpre-
tation is that the analysis is overdetermined by the 
supposed intentions of those same authorities -which, in 
turn, overdetermines the confessional coherence of post-
Tridentine church. According to this understanding, a 
predetermined confessional result is expected, and this is 
precisely why the disjunct between the supposed inten-
tions of the authorities and the results of the process lead-
ing De Boer to state that “essential in [his] study is the 
distinction of intent and effect” (Boer 2001: 87). The 
problem with this perspective, as denounced by Ditch-
field, is that by countering the protestant parochialism of 
the Weberian and Confessionalization Theses by exhibit-
ing the muscular tone of the disciplinary system in Bor-
romean Lombardy, it still fails to overcome the confes-
sional divide by precisely reinforcing and predetermining 
confessional boundaries.
More recently, the example of Early Modern Iberia 
has provided a fertile ground to explore the constitution 
of modern subjectivity as a process that transcended con-
fessional and cultural boundaries but, at the same time, 
resulted in the affirmation of collective (and individual) 
identities. Mass conversions in Early Modern Iberia, and 
the subsequent necessity to integrate those converted mi-
norities, posed a tremendous challenge to traditional so-
cio-cultural categories. Suspicion about the sincerity of 
the converts -whether real or imaginary- and the indeter-
minacy brought by the dissolution of religious difference 
resulted in the emergence of a general atmosphere of anx-
iety over individual and collective identity. This climate 
was a fertile ground for the proliferation of skeptical atti-
tudes and doubt which permeated all aspects of life from 
everyday relationships to intellectual elaborations. In an 
effort to control these indeterminacies, new institutional-
ized narratives and devices were developed to control in-
dividual and collective identity. Instruments of discipline 
and surveillance sought the accurate definition of inner 
self. This institutional regulation of interiority, however, 
did not impede - and in fact many times fostered- the ap-
pearance of resistance and the proliferation of interiority 
as the locus of a conscious -critical- self. Hence, as it has 
been suggested, the Iberian context offers an additional 
perspective on the process of forming Modern subjectivi-
ty which has generally been overlooked in traditional nar-
ratives. Moreover, it is a view that goes beyond the con-
fessional and cultural boundaries set by traditional 
approaches (García-Arenal, 2016).
Several works have already initiated the study of par-
ticular aspects of this context and, more importantly, have 
highlighted its cross-confessional dimension. Specially 
relevant are the works on the relational nature of alum-
bradismo (Pastore, 2004), the repercussion of Loyola’s 
Spiritual Exercises (Sluhovsky, 2013) and the cross-cul-
tural repercussions of the taqiyya -the islamic term for 
religious dissimulation- (García-Arenal, 2013). These 
works are all the more relevant since they have explored 
practices with broad implications for the emergence of in-
ner religiosity, introspection, doubt, and self-criticism. 
The implications of those examples multiply if we con-
sider how evangelization, discipline, and the regulation of 
manners, far from being practices restricted to particular 
cultural settings, had similar manifestations across the 
European context as well as those traditionally consid-
ered as colonial contexts7, which has led to confirm a con-
tinuity in the proliferation of similar disciplinary systems 
in all those situations (Prosperi, 1996: 551; Ditchfield, 
2013: 30; Cañete and Torres, 2017).
All these works have certainly contributed to a more 
profound understanding of the multiple and contradictory 
dimensions of the process of constructing modern subjec-
tivity. Overall, we consider a fundamental conclusion of 
these efforts to be the overcoming of confessional determi-
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nation of this process -centered in Protestantism, as a reac-
tion to it, or focused in religious minorities- which must 
also be accompanied by a permanent consideration of the 
ways in which this process actually stimulated the forma-
tion of those confessional boundaries and individual identi-
ties. Hence, this situation is not distinct from any responsi-
ble approach to the wider phenomenon of Modernity, 
which constantly exhibits universal and particular manifes-
tations that permanently challenge and reinforce each oth-
er. In the case of the formation of modern subjectivity, it is 
also relevant to consider that self-fashioning had collective 
as well as individual manifestations. This ambivalent na-
ture creates a perfect environment for the proliferation of 
forms of coercion and discipline but also a space for interi-
or affirmation and resistance. This context makes it even 
more necessary to explore ways to represent this Janus-
faced reality. How could we comprehend this complexity? 
Other authors have offered models to define this am-
bivalent reality. It is the case of the german sociologist 
Norbert Elias (2000), who in his major work about the civi-
lizing process proposed a model that considered both the 
social and individual dimensions of disciplinary systems. 
The notion of the civilizing process, through the study of 
Early Modern courtly regulations of manners, also sought 
to provide an explanation for the formation of a universal 
social tendency in self-discipline and, simultaneously, of 
the particular national formations in which this process re-
sulted. From the perspective of intellectual history, Richard 
Popkin presented his History of Scepticism (Popkin, 2003) 
as a narrative in which skeptical attitudes where a common 
denominator of both religious and anti-religious authors, 
Protestant and Catholic, old and new Christians. According 
to him, skepticism, as a fundamental characteristic of mod-
ern thought, was not the product of a particular confession-
al context but, rather, was the emerging result of a polemi-
cal dynamic and, hence, simultaneously, contributed to the 
affirmation of each confession, the questioning of the rest 
of them and, ultimately, all of them.
We certainly think that there is an undeniable cross-
confessional dimension of the processes of Modernity, and 
-particularly in its intellectual dimension- of the emer-
gence of modern subjectivity. As Stuart Clark has argued, 
there were themes and mechanisms (rhetoric, casuistry) 
that recurred in the formation of modern consciousness in 
Protestant and Catholic contexts alike (Clark, 1997: 64-
65). Prudence also became a major common denominator 
of self-fashioning attitudes in those contexts (Martin, 
1997). However, while we completely endorse that there 
was a continuity of interests or, rather, concerns and pre-
occupations that resulted in similar responses across con-
fessional boundaries -which could be considered a “field 
of problems”-, we also believe that those ideas also af-
firmed particular positions, either individual, social, politi-
cal, or confessional. Therefore, a close regard to the intel-
lectual formation of modern consciousness would offer a 
complex image of tensions between the universal and the 
particular, the social and the individual, the authority and 
the subversive. We believe that to explore what is beyond 
confessional and social limits in the modern construction 
of subjectivity it is necessary to understand how those 
transgressions were always the product of particular expe-
riences, which is precisely what made them examples of 
self-assertion. This is why, as the axis for such a survey, 
we suggest the example of a particular author who experi-
enced the raw historicity of those tensions as a conflict be-
tween interiority and exteriority in his courtly milieu. This 
author is the Portuguese António Lopes da Veiga (or 
López de Vega), undeniably one of the most radical skep-
tical thinkers of seventeenth-century Iberia.
THE LONE MAN WHO LAUgHS
The dialogue between Heraclitus and Democritus has 
enjoyed a long literary and philosophical life. The con-
trast between the weeping philosopher and the laughing 
philosopher illustrates different levels of discursive ten-
sion: from the likelihood of a more-or-less personally-en-
gaged social criticism to the formulation of a radical dis-
enchantment with the misery of the world, in which — as 
was Father Vieira’s case — Democritus’s laughter is 
nothing more than another form of lamentation (Vieira, 
2001); from the topical illustration of physical character-
istics and character traits linked with the bodily humours, 
to a finely shaded discussion of serious epistemological 
problems (García Gómez, 1984). This last was the case of 
Montaigne — a key figure in adapting ancient problems 
of Greek skepticism to modern philosophical thought — 
when he invoked Democritus and Heraclitus in dealing 
with the problem of phenomenon and appearance, and its 
rule in the discursive regime of truth: objects can appear 
with distinct characteristics to different subjects (wine 
that is sweet to one person can be sour to another), and 
thus one can suppose that both characteristics belong to 
the object (Heraclitus), or that what is perceived has noth-
ing to do with the essence of the object (Democritus). De-
spite Greek skepticism’s varied interpretations of this 
point, Montaigne appears to integrate both solutions as 
part of the same problem, which leads in the end to a ma-
terialistic view of the phenomena: appearance, whether or 
not it has any direct relation to the object, is still a physi-
cal object which presents itself to us with its characteris-
tics. Thus Montaigne opens up a problem which classical 
Pyrrhonism had managed to keep closed: ‘the trap of the 
underlying worlds’ (‘le piège des arrière-mondes’) behind 
the appearances (Paganini, 2008: 53), with its consequent 
tension between interior and exterior, practice and truth 
— a tension that produces a completely new elaboration 
of the ideas of truth and appearance. The result is an apo-
ria which, in Montaigne’s case, was resolved not so much 
by any original theoretical elaboration as by a reflective 
method of writing (Paganini, 2008: 55). Nevertheless, his 
work reveals skepticism’s modern face, and gives an 
original shape to those aspects through which European 
modernity would lay hold of doubt as it grappled with the 
rift between appearance and reality — whether in terms 
of the subject’s internal representation or of the cognitive 
relationship between subject and object through the phe-
nomenal screen. Phenomena now acquired a complex 
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value which no longer depended on the object but rather 
on the structure of the subject itself: an objectifiable phe-
nomenon that can either be described in terms of its phys-
ical and mechanical manifestations, or else can be sub-
jected to criticism in its dogmatic — such as moral or 
religious — aspects (Paganini, 2008: 59-60). 
A radical expression of skepticism based on the net 
external-internal division can be found in one of those 
seventeenth-century Spanish works that recovered, in a 
more original way, the topos of the philosophers who 
laugh and weep: Heráclito y Demócrito de nuestro siglo, 
by António Lopes da Veiga or López de Vega. It is, in the 
opinion of Jeremy Robbins, one of seventeenth-century 
Spain’s most original intellectual works (Robbins, 2007: 
178-200). In his exposition of this book, Robbins high-
lights the skeptical principles which Lopes da Veiga ex-
plicitly claimed for his own: except for the divine truths 
known by faith, and mathematical demonstrations, noth-
ing can be known with certainty, at least in the name of 
science (Robbins, 2007: 179). All the realms of the natu-
ral and human world are subject to such contingencies as 
to make any solid and rational knowledge impossible. 
Thus, Lopes da Veiga’s Democritus aims his laughter at 
the natural philosophers and experimentalists, who be-
lieve they can derive knowledge from the facts they expe-
rience under conditions that are impossible to control 
(Robbins, 2007: 182). When he treats of classical philos-
ophy, Democritus divides it into three schools: Dogmat-
ics, Academics, and Skeptics. As Robbins points out, 
when Lopes da Veiga speaks of ‘Skeptics’, he is referring 
to the Pyrrhonists; in fact, at one point Democritus refers 
to himself as a Pyrrhonist. This is inexact, however, for 
he does not argue for a total avoidance of assertion but 
rather for the possibility of believing in something which, 
while not absolutely infallible, allows for a degree of 
“credible and probable” (“verosímil y probable”) knowl-
edge. This is a position proper to the Academics (Rob-
bins, 2007: 180), which of course sends us back to the 
central problem of moral probabilism (Robbins, 2007: 
187ff). The methodological principles held by Lopes da 
Veiga were stated by Democritus: judgement should not 
be linked to the principle of authority but only to the “dis-
enchanted light of [natural] reason” (“la desengañada luz 
de la razón”), which is “the sure, universal mother of all 
sciences”. When in doubt,
free judgement [...] fits poorly with reflecting by faith on 
human things, and only the highest degree of probability 
discovered by its own speculations will allow it, in am-
biguous matters, to be partial to this or that solution 
(Lopes da Veiga, 1641: 9-10).8
Natural reason, criticism of the principle of authority, 
skepticism, neo-Stoicism, probabilism: it is not always 
easy to find intellectual consistency with a philosophical 
tradition in this cluster of questions associated with Lopes 
da Veiga. Rather, one must explore the way in which he 
develops skeptical discourse in fields like political 
thought, preceptive poetics, or critical history.
For Lopes da Veiga, the act of “disenchantment” (“de-
sengaño”, lit. ‘untricking’, the state of being undeceived) 
produces the singular figure of the “Lone Man at Court”, 
which he develops in the dialogues of the Philosopher and 
the Courtier, collected in Paradoxas racionales, a work he 
had completed in 1655, near the end of his life, and had 
prepared for publication, but which in fact was not pub-
lished until 1935. The Lone Man at Court is the figure of 
the disenchanted Philosopher, initially a contrasting figure 
to the topical Lone Man of the Village. To retire to the city 
allowed him to live according to the dictates of reason 
without the discomforts of rural life, which is full of vil-
lage people whose reason serves “only for personal gain 
and damage to others”,9 where it is impossible to pass un-
noticed or to escape the control of a society in which “eve-
rything is seen. Everything is noticed. Everything is spo-
ken badly of”10 (Lopes da Veiga, 1935: 15); where every 
argument is founded on the principle of local authority, 
and ‘in every conversation, what such-and-such a wise 
man said is taken as the voice of an oracle, and the proof 
of whatever is being discussed is what so-and-so said’ 
(Lopes da Veiga, 1935: 15).11 Urban retirement as a space 
for the operation of reason is the first indication of the 
epistemological dimension of this topography, which con-
stitutes (as we shall see) a central point of Lopes da Vei-
ga’s thought (Ocasar Ariza, 2015: 349-351), based on the 
net distinction between appearance and truth.
HUMAN INEqUALITY
The issue of human inequality was one of Lopes da 
Veiga’s obsessions. It was the topic of the initial dia-
logues in Heráclito i Demócrito, and also of the second 
“Paradoxa” in his Paradoxas racionales, titled, “La difer-
encia de la sangre i de los nacimientos ni tiene verdad en 
la naturaleza ni es más que una vanidad ridícula al verda-
dero filósofo” (‘The difference of blood and birth has no 
true basis in nature and is nothing more than a laughable 
conceit to the true philosopher’) (Lopes da Veiga, 1935: 
34ss). In this dialogue a philosopher and a courtier debate 
whether social inequalities have a natural origin. The 
courtier believes that birth in either a noble or a humble 
family is a matter of nature. In fact, nature itself manifests 
differences between species and between races within 
each species. To inherit blood from one’s parents is, in the 
final analysis, a matter of nature also. The philosopher, 
answering these arguments, gives two reasons why ine-
quality is not a question of nature: neither republics nor 
ministers nor princes have received the power from na-
ture or its Author to “change and qualify” (“cambiar i 
calificar”) blood; and not even nature or God himself 
could do that without at the same time changing the spe-
cies (a radical and “modern” version of the problem of 
the extent of power and God’s will at a time when the 
idea of nature was expanding conceptually). Lopes da 
Veiga underlines the radical separation between “natural 
law” and “civil law” or “political law”, and adheres to the 
typical Tacitist idea of dual morality (Núñez, 2007: 87), 
although the consequences of this are not always of the 
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same sort. In Heráclito i Demócrito, Lopes da Veiga con-
nects “natural law” to the myth of the Golden Age in-
voked by the poets, when human equality was supposed 
to have existed. But it is useless to give credit to such a 
myth once inequality, with its nobility and monarchies, 
has entered History ; rather, one must accept it with a 
view to preservation, although the wise person knows in 
his heart that social distinctions and values linked to hon-
our have nothing to do with truth:
It is not a type of flattery to accept, in political terms, 
what political law has been able to furnish for the pur-
pose of good government. Thus one ought to laugh in-
ternally in agreement with the natural law that makes 
everyone equal, while externally accommodating one-
self to the civil order that establishes differences. And 
this distinction holds true, both in what is felt and in 
what is manifest, even though they seem to be contra-
dictory actions (Lopes da Veiga, 1641: 15).12 
This distinction between the exterior world of cere-
monies and the interior world of truths has its counterpart 
in religion:
As for the others, be aware that, just as Religion has two 
types of worship, one internal and the other external, so 
the same division exists in human considerations and 
venerations. Internal veneration, I freely admit, is owed 
by the wise man only to either intellectual or moral vir-
tue. But external veneration, so long as it is moderate 
(taking into account the custom of the world, which you 
alone are not sufficient to amend), is required of you by 
civil life and the need to preserve yourself (Lopes da 
Veiga, 1641: 13-14).13
If Democritus criticises those who invoke a Golden 
Age of natural human equality, and calls for respect for 
the social hierarchy as a means of maintaining political 
order, the Paradoxas racionales seem to show a prefer-
ence for the philosopher’s disenchantment in the face of 
the “falseness” that comes from the “showiness in haugh-
ty ostentation” (“figurería en las ostentaciones endiosa-
das”) of those who take their noble birth seriously, in a 
ridiculous spectacle from a farce or comedy (Lopes da 
Veiga, 1635: 41). The different ways that people ought to 
be treated in accordance with their social status can be 
imposed by “the political government or the style of each 
province [...] but the wise and disenchanted person will 
reserve internally a right knowledge of the truth of each 
one’s essence”,14 accommodating himself, as regards ex-
ternals, to what he cannot change or reform (Lopes da 
Veiga, 1635: 41-2). Criticism of aristocratic values linked 
to lineage and honour (“the maddest form of tyranny”, “la 
tiranía más loca”) becomes even more radical when 
speaking of the military profession, 
so glorious according to political reason but, according 
to natural reason, a brutality unworthy of humans. And 
military valour, according to this same judgement, 
ought to be called bestial savagery rather than valour 
(Lopes da Veiga, 1635: 76).15 
In criticising wars, he places most of the blame on 
kings or a few free republics which,
not content with subjugating the bodies of their subjects, 
have extended themselves to wishing to subjugate their 
minds as well and persuade us that we ought not only to 
obey and serve them with our bodily members but even 
with our reason, giving the same credit to their decisions 
that they give to divine ones, even to the extent of repu-
diating the latter and the natural law on which they are 
based (Lopes da Veiga, 1635: 86).16
In this sense the Paradoxas racionales appears to be 
the counterpoint to El perfeto señor, a political work in 
which Lopes da Veiga describes, not the interior vision of 
the disenchanted man, but what external practice of polit-
ical government should be. In this work he recommends, 
for example, different ways of treating people according 
to their condition and the public good (Lopes da Veiga, 
1653: 28-36). In some sense, Lopes da Veiga appears to 
offer in his writings a tri-part position with regard to the 
political problem of the separation between the interior 
and the exterior, or natural and civil law: the position of 
him who stands within the logic of governmental prac-
tice, as in El perfeto señor; the position of the disenchant-
ed philosopher who knows the natural reality below the 
laughable social conventions, and who, in the Paradoxas, 
sees the interior life of the wise person retired at court as 
the place of truth; and finally the position of Democritus, 
who laughs at the illusions of natural equality that expect 
to transform the hierarchical and political order, and who 
adopts a cynical skepticism regarding the possibility of 
bringing together the natural and political laws. One 
might say that each of these positions is a response, not to 
the ridiculous external “reality”, but to the ways in which 
the subject arranges and sees himself with respect to that 
external “reality”. As in Montaigne’s case, the aporia of 
the idea of the “arrière mondes” consists of creating a 
strong idea of the materiality of the phenomena, which de 
facto loses its merely illusory character and becomes the 
horizon with which the various possible forms of subjec-
tivity align themselves. This is a crucial point, constitut-
ing — as Paganini has indicated — one of the ways that 
Stoic philosophy and Greek skepticism were recovered 
by Modern Europe. It also forms a central axis for the ex-
pression of the moral problem made explicit by Lopes da 
Veiga’s epistemological scheme, as Robbins says; name-
ly, the notion of probabilism, which is the key element 
informing a good part of the political, scientific, and his-
toriographical debates of the period.
LITERARY DISPUTATIONS 
For Lopes da Veiga, a literary disputation was the 
only occasion when a philosopher who was retired at 
court ought to set aside his modesty and the solitude of 
his retreat. His sixth “Paradoxa” is titled, “En las contien-
das literarias, más desayuda que aprovecha la modestia, i 
el que no se hiziere temer con el modo no se hará estimar 
Culture & History Digital Journal 6(2), December 2017, e012. eISSN 2253-797X, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.3989/chdj.2017.012
When Hell is Other People. Interiority and Skepticism in António Lopes da Veiga • 7
con la sustancia” (“In literary contests, modesty is more a 
hindrance than a help, and he who does not make himself 
feared by his manner will not be esteemed for his sub-
stance”) (Lopes da Veiga, 1635: 125). A learned person 
ought to be more feared than loved, and should provoke 
such fear in his adversaries that they will not dare to 
speak in his presence. Here the notable interior-exterior 
separation acquires a new meaning in Lopes da Veiga’s 
discourse: if someone does not dare to dispute publicly 
with a learned person, the motives for such reluctance 
— being convinced by the other’s argument; fear of being 
made to look a fool — matter little. What truly matters is 
external respect; those who witness the dispute “do not 
guess at nor pay attention to motives”. In order for one to 
acquire respect, “in controversies there is no means more 
à propos than to make oneself feared, whether by being 
known for one’s self-suffiency, or by the sharpness of 
one’s replies, or by one’s belittling of objections” (Lopes 
da Veiga, 1635: 128).17 This is an argument that puts util-
ity above honour or reason, and which Lopes da Veiga 
derives from his personal experience as a controversialist 
in the “depraved” Spain of his time, with its abundance of 
“people who are taken to be oracles by everyone who 
speaks to them, for no other reason than that they give 
solutions confidently and treat those who contradict them 
with scorn” (Lopes da Veiga, 1635: 129).18 In literary dis-
putes, to seek to be loved by others is a sure way of being 
despised, because what everyone truly loves is his own 
opinion. Lopes da Veiga was an experienced man in the 
literary and courtly environment of seventeenth-century 
Spain. There he had tried with varying success to make a 
career for himself, from his role as secretary to Bernardi-
no Fernández de Velasco to his quest for the generosity of 
protectors such Manuel Álvarez Pinto y Ribera or Fran-
cisco Fernández de la Cueva (Acquier, 2000). The al-
ready-mentioned vicissitudes of his political thought and 
ways of interpreting the distance between civil and natu-
ral law have been the subject of a variety of interpreta-
tions; they could perhaps be integrated into the evolution 
of his courtly and academic career, and the varied con-
sciousness of the separation between “mode” and “sub-
stance” which, in different ways, permeates the whole of 
courtly literature (Acquier, 2000: passim ). The dialogue 
genre, while always recalling classical models such as 
Cicero, underwent a radical change throughout the Early 
Modern Period, reflecting conditions of new literary and 
courtly institutions of sociability, in which the rules of 
communication were substantially transformed. Doubt 
was no longer a tool of argument, used in the dialogue as 
a maieutic technique for eliciting the truth; rather, it was 
now shown to be a solvent attacking forms of constructed 
authority, a tool of the reasoning power that acted on the 
basis of the new concept of distance between exterior and 
interior (Ong, 1958).
António Lopes da Veiga knew the world of literary 
controversies well; he participated in it keenly and even 
organized debates at his house (Sánchez, 1961: 123-134). 
From his retirement at court, the Philosopher of the Para-
doxas racionales describes such controversies in negative 
terms, taking a position that eludes “the ordinary competi-
tions, gatherings, academies, and courtly congregations”19 
which, in Spain, unlike other countries, had become “a 
terrible battleground, a perpetual iron-worker’s shop of 
thundering voices and controversies,” where conceit and 
arrogance predominated, and which were more like battles 
than places where “truth is investigated”. In the end, they 
were “gatherings of different hierarchies of ‘men of un-
derstanding’, not all of them refined by studies, but rather 
a mix of drones and worker bees; of ignorant men to 
whom ‘good reason’ was attributed, and experts [...]”.20 
This hierarchy is made up of diverse classes: those who 
lack an education, who “learn some principles in that 
place which they would be better off not to have heard, 
and, using them, intrepidly enter into any topic that is pro-
posed,”21 employing without rhyme or reason the “little 
reasons” they heard “the day before”; and the meek igno-
rant men “who listen and are silent when points of science 
are argued”,22 who look for recognition by a different 
means, whether by “grace and elegance”, or “jests and 
witticisms, most of the time consisting of the sudden twist 
of a double meaning”.23 The educated men, finally, lacking 
in modesty, “go ahead and decide that whatever their pro-
posal might be is a matter of faith, while condemning all 
the others as heresy”,24 which results in a “hubbub of voic-
es and Babylonian confusion”25 in which — unlike in oth-
er countries — all that is sought is “a show of superiority 
either in one’s studies or one’s cleverness” (Lopes da Vei-
ga, 1935: 20-23).26 One might compare the sarcasm with 
which Lopes da Veiga’s Democritus treats literary meet-
ings with the happiness shown by Manuel de Faria y Sou-
sa’s Democritus when spending all his money travelling 
the world searching for conversation with other men 
(Sosa, 1674: 28). The same impulse that in the latter 
showed itself in a hope of human communication through 
dialogue, in Lope da Veiga has become a radical disen-
chantment with social institutions and courtly rhetoric. 
In Lopes da Veiga, this type of meeting, of the sort 
that was common in the Madrid of his day, had at least 
two dimensions: on the one hand, its social aspect, in 
which literary controversy marked out a space of courtly 
sociability. There, along with literary and erudite argu-
ments, those in attendance spoke about: “What places and 
types of employment have been given out or appear likely 
to be given out again? What places in public government 
are the most prestigious and the most worthy to be sought 
after? What styles are observed in the law courts?”27 and 
other such issues of court politics (Lopes da Veiga, 1935: 
28). Lopes da Veiga’s critiques of academic meetings are 
counted among the most radical of the seventeenth cen-
tury (King, 1963: 99). In relation to this central collection 
of concerns it is possible to establish an additional link to 
his political thought: let us not forget that Lopes da Veiga 
was secretary to the Condestable Bernardino Fernández 
de Velasco, an important figure in reorganising the man-
agement of documents in that noble house, and who had a 
high notion of the political dimension of its archive, its 
history, and its literary culture as they were connected to 
the construction of his lineage’s memory.
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On the other hand, the literary meetings also had an 
epistemological dimension. It is possible to fit Lopes da 
Veiga within a cultural shift that radically affected the 
function of the dialogue as a dialectical expression of a 
certain regime of truth. This is a commonplace of “mod-
ern philosophy”. For example, Robert Boyle, in his fero-
cious criticism of the culture of scholastic dialectic, 
wrote: 
[…] the litigious philosophy of the schools seldom fur-
nishes its disciples with better than dialectical or prob-
able arguments, which are not proper, either fully to 
satisfie the person that employs them, or leave his ad-
versary without any answer, plausible at least, if not 
full as probable as the objection; upon which account, 
men that have more wit than sincere love of truth, will 
be able to dispute speciously enough […] (Boyle, 
1690: 46).
In Lopes da Veiga’s own words, this is a criticism of 
those who, lacking education and arguments, prefer to lay 
hold of “flattery and forceful boldness” (“la carantoña i 
de la violencia del descaramiento”); people who respect 
nobody and whose success is owing to the fact that, 
since the questions usually raised for discussion are the 
sort that cannot be demonstrated mathematically, a clev-
er person will always find a means of escape, and even a 
means of attacking the most accepted conclusions of 
learned men” (Lopes da Veiga, 1935: 22).28
The “mathematical demonstration” alluded to here 
expresses the reach and limits of the speculative method. 
As to its reach, the mathematical system is the proper 
means of expression for the true sciences, because it is 
the only one that is accurately demonstrable. Beyond 
mathematics, that which can be known with certainty is 
so slight that it is equal to nothing, and therefore useless: 
To speculate about the secrets of Nature, the Causes and 
Effects of all that the Universe contains, is undeniably 
praiseworthy to the extent that it represents the curiosity 
of the Understanding and the exercise of the Mind. But 
to make it one’s principal occupation, to hang one’s rep-
utation, or loss of it, on this, given the uncertainty of all 
its conclusions and the little usefulness that follows 
from such Study, is not only, in my opinion, unworthy 
of praise, but is a most undignified and laughable objec-
tive no matter how one looks at it (Lopes da Veiga, 
1641: 225-226).29 
This skepticism with respect to the possibility of es-
tablishing sure knowledge about things is the reason why 
he calls himself a “Pyrrhonist”. Once one moves beyond 
the limits of sure mathematical knowledge, the only valid 
criterion is utility, which is understood as the governing 
and preserving of life. For this reason, the true philoso-
pher should dedicate himself to searching for what is 
most useful, not to theoretical speculation. As his Dem-
ocritus says: “I call ‘wise’, not the most speculative per-
son, but the one who knows what is most to his advan-
tage” (Lopes da Veiga, 1641: 337).30 For this reason the 
education of philosophers should include some mathe-
matics, enough to allow for “interacting and conversing” 
(“el trato y las conversaciones”), and a few rudiments that 
can be used in commerce or for making purchases in the 
marketplace, for music, or for eventually dedicating him-
self to building fortifications or other practical activities. 
Speculative wise men like Anaxagoras or Thales aban-
doned the search for utility in favour of speculations, and 
for that reason one lost his property and the other fell into 
a pit (Lopes da Veiga, 1641: 337-8).
HISTORY, gRAMMAR, AND CRITICISM
History also lacks that utility that classical thought 
had given it as life’s teacher and prudence’s staff. A staff, 
Democritus says ironically, is only good for the lame or 
the feeble (Lopes da Veiga, 1641: 197). History is a hu-
man work, and as such is subject to all sorts of passions. 
It is impossible to find among humans unvarying infor-
mation about the same acts. Beyond a few general facts 
that everyone knows, no single truth about human history 
can be established. History’s authority derives from the 
fact that it is presented in printed form and arranged by 
chapters (Lopes da Veiga, 1641: 198-9); one might say 
that its authority depends on its appearance of authority. 
For the rest, those who invoke the usefulness of history 
for human government have never really learned any-
thing solid about history. On the contrary, the naturally 
perverse person learns from history “to know the defects 
of other people’s lineages” or to “support those of his 
own.”31 The historian, pulling a single thread, weaves a 
discursive plot that transforms news into Science in order 
to dazzle the ignorant (Lopes da Veiga, 1641: 199). 32 In 
the final analysis, a prudent man can derive a certain 
amount of useful teaching from historical documents to 
satisfy his own curiosity or in aid of his public responsi-
bilities, “even so, abstracting it from the truth or falsity of 
the accounts”;33 but in general the humanities only serve 
people of “vain showiness, if not evil curiosity” (Lopes 
da Veiga, 1641: 201).34
The accusation of useless speculation that Lopes da 
Veiga launches at Natural Philosophy returns in rawer 
form when he attacks the “arrogant crowd of Grammari-
ans and Critics [...] the ignorant rabble and dung [...] of the 
literary men”.35 Grammar, interested only in the names of 
things, is concerned with the first and second instruments 
of the sciences, and creates authority “about letters, sylla-
bles and words, without which it is impossible to write or 
speak; authority with the power to insult or approve the 
images and expressions of concepts, if not the concepts 
themselves, and to fill in or amend the most authentic 
texts”;36 a childish study, in other words, “incapable of 
penetrating to Wisdom’s interior”,37 while giving its prac-
titioners “the sovereignty over externals” (Lopes da Veiga, 
1641: 131).38 It is an ostentatious and pompous knowl-
edge, which triumphs at court; based, not on the use of 
reason, but on the principle of authority, which leads them 
to accumulate citations of authors instead of thinking for 
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themselves. In reality, it is an insubstantial knowledge, 
limited to establishing an expression’s propriety or impro-
priety, “vocabulary meanings, the pronunciation and ac-
centing of words, the spacing of syllables, assonances and 
dissonances, the sibilance or silence of letters” (Lopes da 
Veiga, 1641: 135).39 In dedicating themselves to the sci-
ences’ first principles, grammarians exercise “a perpetual 
beginner’s profession”,40 standing “fixed and permanently 
at the threshold of the door of knowledge” (Lopes da Vei-
ga, 1641: 134) 41, with no ability for “disputing and recog-
nising the inner nature of opinions, questions, and scientif-
ic discourse” (Lopes da Veiga, 1641: 135).42 The Critics’ 
knowledge is like the Grammarians’: “to correct corrupted 
words, modify collocations, approve or reject the readings 
of citations” are tasks “that do not go beyond the region of 
words” (Lopes da Veiga, 1641: 138).43 Critics — unlike 
Expositors (who interpret necessary books and determine 
the best readings for important citations) — are not occu-
pied with the major Sciences, but with a miscellany of the 
poetical, the historical, and matters of no usefulness 
(Lopes da Veiga, 1641: 138); they “denaturalise the es-
sence and qualities of each thing, making the object to be 
the instrument, and the instrument, the object” (Lopes da 
Veiga, 1641: 138-9).44 Here, once again, the interior-exte-
rior fissure has taken on a sociological as well as an episte-
mological value: externals consign us to superficial 
knowledge; internals lead to the higher sciences, whose 
methodological model is mathematics.
A fIELD Of PROBLEMS
Lopes da Veiga’s thought directs us to an intellectual 
field where epistemological, political, literary, and moral 
problems intersect on the basis of a strong distinction be-
tween interior and exterior. Lopes da Veiga appears to 
place his own intellectual horizon outside Spain, particu-
larly when he alludes several times to places where, un-
like Spain, “men learn through disputation, and they dis-
pute in order to learn the little that can be known” (Lopes 
da Veiga, 1935: 24). In fact, as has already been written 
(Robbins, 2007), it is not hard to place Lopes da Veiga’s 
work within the context of European skepticism, which 
during those same years was producing key works by 
Descartes, La Mothe Le Vayer, Gassendi, and Pascal, and 
whose outstanding representatives in the Iberian tradition 
included Pedro de Valencia and Francisco Sánchez. The 
allusion to “Pyrrhonism” was not simply a reference to 
classical philosophy, but an intellectual context in which 
the epistemological and methodological problem had a 
central effect on political and theological thought, on the 
order of the knowledge disciplines, and on the theory of 
representation. In order to place Lopes da Veiga within 
this intellectual context, it would be enough to recall how 
the method of “rational paradoxes”, which attempted to 
use reason to show that common sense was nonsense, 
goes back to a tradition that was to be instrumental for the 
skeptics of the first half of the seventeenth century. One 
might recall what La Mothe Le Vayer said about his own 
paradoxes and the way in which philosophical thought 
contradicts the “sentiments ordinaires & des opinions 
reçeuës” (La Mothe Le Vayer, 1630: 203). For his part, 
Pierre Gassendi first published his Exercitationes para-
doxicae in 1624, expounding the foundations of his own 
skeptical, Pyrrhonic, and anti-Aristotelian system of log-
ic, whose first stage is expressed in paradoxical form. As 
is known, Gassendi’s attack on Aristotelian logic had as 
its starting point the problem of truth and appearance. 
From his typically skeptical and Pyrrhonic viewpoint, it 
was impossible to transcend appearances and make a sol-
id judgement about interior truth. Using this principle, 
Gassendi launched his devastating attack on Aristotelian 
and scholastic logic and syllogistic, which were defini-
tively impotent in the face of vera rerum natura; the 
“paradoxes” serve to illustrate the blind spots of Aristote-
lian logic and dogmatic science. For Gassendi, the exit 
from the skeptical cul-de-sac was found in a subsequent 
recourse to Epicurus, which allowed him to bring in the 
possibility of forming ideas based on the senses, and an 
insistence on making judgements based on ideas tested 
experimentally (Jones, 1981). In this sense, the radical 
skepticism of Lopes da Veiga had an anti-experimental 
side, which depended on a radical mistrust of the possi-
bility of deducing any sure knowledge from appearances; 
an intellectual pessimism that Lopes shared with, for ex-
ample, Gracián (Robbins, 197). 
Here we can observe one of the limits of Lopes da Vei-
ga’s thought as regards epistemology. When he invokes 
mathematics as the only method for the major sciences, he 
does so in the context of a major polemic concerning the 
status of mathematics as a science. In Aristotelian tradition 
mathematics were largely outside the canon of logic, and 
therefore outside the regime of truth. Although late 
neo-Aristotelian tradition attempted to include mathemat-
ics as a form of knowledge, it did so in a way that did not 
relate it to the natural world; in other words, the truth of 
the mathematical method was limited to mathematical en-
tities, which were themselves “unnatural”. The demon-
strative character of mathematics within that Aristotelian 
tradition was thought to be inadequate for determining the 
causes of things and the knowledge of essences. This was 
the dominant tradition, for example, in Portuguese univer-
sities during the seventeenth century (Carolino, 2007). 
Lopes da Veiga, for his part, gives a central scientific sta-
tus to the mathematical method, but he does not take the 
key step of making mathematics the central method of nat-
ural philosophy. One can compare, for example, Lopes da 
Veiga’s view with Descartes’ mention of mathematics in 
“Part One” of his Discours de la méthode: 
Je me plaisais surtout aux mathématiques, à cause de la 
certitude et de l’évidence de leurs raisons; mais je ne 
remarquais point encore leur vrai usage, et, pensant 
qu’elles ne servaient qu’aux arts mécaniques, je 
m’étonnais de ce que, leurs fondements étant si fermes 
et si solides, on n’avait rien bâti dessus de plus relevé.
As we have seen, Lopes da Veiga, too, admired the 
certainty and evidential character of mathematical rea-
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soning, but he seems to have limited its usefulness to the 
“mechanical arts” and did not ask himself about “leur vrai 
usage”; that is, he did not take the fundamental step of 
linking mathematics to natural philosophy, precisely be-
cause of his skepticism with regard to any possibility of 
certain knowledge. This was, of course, a debate that was 
widespread in all Europe, in which the more radical skep-
tics doubted mathematical formalism. For example, this 
appears to have been the cause of the clash between Cre-
monini and Galileo: the extreme skepticism of the former 
was based on a concept of sensory knowledge drawn 
from the Aristotelian tradition that could not be subjected 
to mathematical formalism nor to the new scientific ex-
perimentalism. At the same time, that idea carried him to 
a radicalism greater than Galileo’s with regard to crucial 
problems like the immortality of the soul; in many re-
spects Cremonini was close to the atheism of Vanini, 
whom undoubtedly he had met, and was imbued with a 
Nicodemism very much like that of Lopes da Veiga — In-
tus ut libet, foris ut moris est — that was the foundation 
of a radical form of utilitarianism (Muir, 2008: 48-54). 
The reclaiming of mathematics and the denunciation of 
rhetoric are two forms of setting out skepticism’s crisis of 
interiority in representational terms. The beginning of 1656 
— that is, around the time that Lopes da Veiga was writing 
his Paradoxas racionales —, was the date of Pascal’s sec-
ond “Provincial Letter”, dedicated to the problem of suffi-
cient grace. Trapped in a spider’s web of arguments and 
debates among Dominicans, Jesuits, and Jansenists, Pascal 
found himself facing the dilemma that, no matter what 
terms he chose to adopt in the debate, he would end up be-
ing either a heretic, a Jansenist, or an outlandish man. The 
problem was that words (just sound, a movement of air) 
were not adequate to express substance: one might debate 
about the sound — or, what is the same thing, the word — 
while the substance is something else. Ambiguous words, 
improper antitheses, unfounded metaphors: the traps of 
language (to call “insufficient” grace “sufficient”) reduced 
problems to a question of rhetoric that ought to be subject-
ed to criticism (Magnard, 1987: 13).
Lopes da Veiga, in his introduction to the Heráclito, 
gives an example of his loathing for philological criti-
cism, explaining that, with regards to orthography, he had 
decided not to pay attention to “derivations from the Lat-
in tongue nor from any other whatsoever from whence 
our words derive, but only to adjust my writing to how 
words are pronounced”. In so doing, he was taking a sin-
gularly coherent position. Philological learning is only a 
superficial covering of dead leaves that does not corre-
spond to the true meaning of things. The orthographic 
question was the subject of prolonged debate in Spain, 
and the defence of the position that words should be rep-
resented according to how they sound, not according to 
etymological tradition, can be found as far back as Mateo 
Alemán and Gonzalo Correas. The latter had a well-
known interest in orthography, which caused him to com-
pose various treatises on the topic. In them, he followed 
Nebrija in arguing for the need to write the Spanish lan-
guage as it was spoken, and to free it from the burden of 
etymology and of those who wished to write according to 
the Latin model (Galán Melo, 1992). These men, said 
Correas, made the Castilian language a slave to Latin 
when in reality Castilian was an ancient and better lan-
guage than Latin (Korreas, 1630: 48). There are various 
ways of interpreting Correas’s position. First, it is a de-
fence of Castilian as an imperial language, in the style of 
Gregorio López Madera’s defence. But this vision of the 
language also has moral implications; in fact, Correas 
published his Ortografía in 1630 together with the En-
kiridión de Epíkteto, one of the means of introducing neo-
Stoicism to Spain. In the dedicatory epistle to the Conde 
Duque de Olivares, Correas writes:
I present two Stoic philosophers to Your Excellency in 
the Castilian language; they are as well-adjusted in the 
costume of words and orthography as they were in their 
reasons and customs. This, the exterior, is my part; the 
interior is what their writings say [...]. They are joyful 
in their robe and clothing, as frugal and simple as was 
their life.45
As with Pascal and Jansenism, there is a relationship 
between grammar, moral philosophy, and logic.
HISTORY AND POLITICS
As we have seen, the anti-experimentalism of Lopes 
da Veiga was based on the impossibility of reducing 
physical data to significant events in terms of knowledge. 
The impossibility of controlling data extended to his con-
cept of politics and history: human actions cannot be re-
duced to a consistent form of knowledge because humans 
are subject to uncontrollable passions, and most of all be-
cause it is impossible to trust witnesses. Such diversity is 
wholly incompatible with the character of truth, which is 
singular; it makes it impossible to derive the same ends 
from the same causes. For the same reason, politics can-
not be reduced to rules nor to a sequence of the laws of 
causality. At this point, some of the contradictions of 
Lopes da Veiga’s utilitarianism become clear, when it 
reaches its conceptual limit with regard to his position on 
so-called políticos. Políticos had continually been the ob-
ject of criticism, constantly accused by their enemies of 
being atheists (Gracián de la Madre de Dios, 1978: 327-
340; Campanella, 2004). Lopes da Veiga’s discourse on 
Políticos closes with a disquisition on atheism, but in his 
case the development of the argument is unusual. The 
Políticos are those who put Reason of State ahead of eve-
ry moral principle, and for this reason they prefer not to 
trust anyone else; they are men
so contrary to every type of Faith that they do not con-
cede even to Divine Faith more than the unavoidable 
appearances necessary for its preservation [...]. They 
wish to examine higher things with the same eyes they 
use to look at earthly things.46
Thus the Políticos study the principles, motives, and 
rites of all the nations and monarchies, and give the same 
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value to all religions, reducing all family connections, 
laws, and God to self-interest (Lopes da Veiga, 1641: 
258-9). These principles scandalize Heraclitus, but Dem-
ocritus finds explanations for them. According to him, 
Políticos are of two classes, either by position or by edu-
cation. The former are actually worthy of praise because 
they carry out a function that is the most useful and nec-
essary of all for the common good and the preservation 
and growth of communities. Regarding the theoretical 
Políticos, who “govern without being governors”47 — 
that is, the Tacitists, who have no more law than what is 
convenient to themselves —, the situation is more com-
plicated. In reality, they only err through excess, because 
they make known how the world is governed. It is true 
that they renounce friendship and the trust of other men, 
but they labour thinking of their own utility,
and, given how the world is, I tell you that they find less 
unpleasantness along the path of hiding their own 
breasts and examining those of others, than on the con-
trary path of trusting the treasures of their secret place to 
the contingency of some evil treatment, and using words 
to open up their heart, which provident Nature has hid-
den to the senses (Lopes da Veiga, 1641: 265).48
No man has ever been rejected for being a Político; 
and, besides, the best course for getting and keeping 
friends is, if not deception, the “magic spell of benefices 
and good communication”.49 In the end, Políticos are the 
men best suited to advance at court.
The impossibility of setting up history as an area of 
certain knowledge places Lopes da Veiga’s thought in a 
singular position, determined, once again, by extreme 
skepticism. In this case, a comparison with Gassendi is 
once again significant: the latter has a notable relationship 
with the world of French historiography though his con-
nection, for example, with Henri Estienne, Gabriel Naudé 
(former disciple of Cremonini), or Peiresc. His interest in 
the use of critical philological tools was crucial to his 
reading and recovery of Epicurus (Joy, 1987: 44-47), to 
the extent of setting up a system of proofs that combines 
empirical and historical arguments; a method that, in fact, 
was derived from a notion of continuity between nature 
and culture, and the relationship between the two (Joy, 
1987: 165-194). At this point one can clearly see the rela-
tionship between Lopes da Veiga’s epistemological skep-
ticism and his political thought: the discontinuity between 
the natural and civil worlds justifies the impossibility of 
turning history into a scientific discipline; as does the 
strict separation that the “disenchanted” wise man sees in 
the world between the hidden inner realm of natural law 
and the vain exterior to which one must nevertheless con-
form. For Gassendi, the continuity between natural and 
civil law was dependent on a social contract that guaran-
teed forms of individual liberty. Unlike with Hobbes, this 
social contract was an extension of the natural state, to 
the extent that living in society was part of human nature 
(Sarasohn, 1996: 142-144). In a certain sense, this conti-
nuity determined Gassendi’s position with regards to pol-
itics: although no universal civil law exists, natural law 
has a universality that makes civil law not be entirely cir-
cumstantial and arbitrary. In this way, he was able to 
modify the Epicurean ethical principle of self-love and 
the pursuit of one’s own happiness, relating it to the hu-
man need for socialization and for seeking the love of 
others (Sarasohn, 1996: 162-3). Lopes da Veiga, as we 
have seen, posits a net discontinuity between natural and 
civil law. The basis of politics is not a contract; rather, it 
is founded upon inequality: some man did something 
worthy of merit (or committed an injustice) and the ad-
vantageous position he gained by it was inherited by his 
descendants. In this way, Lopes da Veiga’s extreme skep-
ticism is different from that of Gassendi or Hobbes — or 
from other writers like Bodin, the representative by an-
tonomasia of Políticos who, as a jurist, started from a po-
sition critical of Roman law (as a civil code exclusively 
for the Roman people, without universal value) in order 
to search for the logical form of a universal civil code that 
could be applied to all of humanity in order to construct 
an historical method (Gerbier, 2009). In his legal thought, 
Lopes da Veiga believed that law was created to restrain 
natural human evil, and that it was therefore necessary.
But since every Nation and Kingdom forms and adjusts 
this legality according to the capacity or whim of its 
Legislators, it turns out that not every Nation correctly 
obtains what it ought to have. And, once it sets out on 
the path of error and acquires the habit of it: no matter 
how much people may later gain experience and cry 
aloud at the disadvantages, the laws come to occupy an 
obligatory position, and come to be tolerated as una-
voidable or unassailable, either because custom has 
made people feel at home with them, or because they 
venerate the Fathers who put them in place, as they 
would Religious Fathers, or because the present gener-
ation thinks it would be horrific to alter what has be-
come old.50
This can be clearly seen in the inheritance of Roman 
law, which is not workable in the present time. The abun-
dance of decrees and norms, which attempt to adapt 
themselves to the plurality of cases and circumstances, 
does nothing more than encourage the cunning of law-
yers, which multiplies the number of possible interpreta-
tions. All this results in “a greater confusion of Science”,51 
with an infinite number of debates and controversies, in 
which knowing the truth is impossible (Lopes da Veiga, 
1641: 238-240). But Lopes da Veiga keeps his distance 
also from a Catholic tradition of understanding human 
history that saw in it a source of theological truth, starting 
from the fact that trust in other human beings is the very 
basis of human society. This was the position of Melchor 
Cano, for example (Cano, 2006: 551ff), which of course 
depended on a notion of natural law quite different from 
that of Lopes da Veiga. For the latter, the philosopher 
should put into practice the moral principle of utility, 
[...] lest they hide themselves, and so that he might have 
principles with which to guess at the underlying inten-
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tions that can exist in any interchange or communication, 
and to turn aside or prevent the evil intent of those with 
whom he is dealing; for if not trusting anyone is a char-
acteristic of the evil Spirit, trusting everyone would seem 
to belong to the Simple spirit. And it is necessary to use 
Art to know how far Human Evil might extend, and to 
become knowledgeable in how the World works, in or-
der not to perish miserably at the hands of the deceptions 
that are practiced (Lopes da Veiga, 1641: 330-1).52
It would be pointless to underline here the conse-
quences of this problematic connection between nature 
and politics in a thinker like Hobbes.
In the end, Religion is what truly separates Lopes da 
Veiga from the political writers. The politicians, he 
writes, challenge both human and divine laws. Yet Lopes 
da Veiga himself, in his discourses, overtly side-steps 
“spiritual motives” proper to “Holy Churchmen” (“Sagra-
dos Eclesiásticos Varones”), in order to concentrate ex-
clusively on the temporal realm (Lopes da Veiga, 1641: 
266). This is a singular exception: it places theology at 
the final frontier of thought in a way that does not actually 
see it as intervening in the world. What really was Lopes 
da Veiga’s religious position?
Descartes, in his Metaphysical Meditations, begins 
with the need to prove by natural reason the existence of 
God and of the immortal soul, even though he has doubts 
about the actual scope of the rational, philosophical dem-
onstration used by those who deny the soul’s immortali-
ty. For his part, Lopes da Veiga begins with a single af-
firmation:
he who does not see his calamity for what it is will hard-
ly feel it to be such, and he who recognizes no Sover-
eign Subject to be blasphemed will hardly be disturbed 
by the seriousness of his mental blasphemy [...]. No one 
is perturbed by what he does not believe in (Lopes da 
Veiga, 1641: 289).53
Nor will they feel “any fear of the First Cause”,54 since 
they “know only Second Causes as the beginning and the 
end, unceasingly circular, of everything in Creation” 
(Lopes da Veiga, 1641: 289).55 This affirmation does not, 
for Lopes da Veiga, give way to a scientific demonstration 
of the existence of God (which he leaves in the hands of 
the “most learned men, [...] whose profession it is to treat 
of it [...]”);56 rather, it produces “Reason’s pure indications 
and prudent conjectures” (Lopes da Veiga, 1641: 289),57 
such as the typical argument from the perfection of the 
fabric of nature and humanity. Clearly, avoiding explicitly 
discussing “spiritual motives” makes clear the autonomy 
of the two realms, Theology and reason. The relationship 
between the two produces a conflict that can already be 
found in Montaigne, and whose interpretation has yielded 
the expression, “skeptical fideism”, an aporia that can be 
precisely defined thus: faith represents, for a human being, 
a far horizon without any mystical implication; that is, it 
marks a frontier that serves to make clear what humanity’s 
sphere of action is (Cardoso, 2009). This appears to be 
Lopes da Veiga’s case, since he establishes a net separa-
tion between the world of reason and the theological 
world. This is an argument developed, for example, by La 
Mothe Le Vayer, who tried to conciliate faith and skepti-
cism by arguing that their spheres of action were totally 
different and that the Scriptures did not refer to the natural 
world. Jesus Christ himself had recommended “loüable 
ignorance” in keeping silent when Pilate asked him: “Quid 
est veritas?” (La Mothe Le Vayer, 1633: 135-136). Lopes 
da Veiga speaks in even more extreme terms about God: 
when arguing that differences of blood are natural facts, 
not political ones, he criticizes those who say that blood 
can be differentiated, which would imply “that republics, 
ministers, and princes have power and authority from na-
ture or its Author to qualify and differentiate blood (which, 
if one looks at it clearly, neither nature itself nor even all 
the omnipotence of its Author can do, without making dis-
tinctions in the species)” (Lopes da Veiga, 1935: 36-7).58 
The modern editor adds a note here saying that “the 
strange phrase [is] in parentheses in the margin. Someone 
else — perhaps out of fear — crossed it out with a double 
line in different ink”. This phrase is loaded with meaning: 
the question of the divine will and its scope in the face of 
nature’s laws was an old theological problem which nev-
ertheless had acquire a new dimension at this period of the 
seventeenth century. This is evidenced by the debate be-
tween Gassendi and Descartes on divine omnipotence, 
published in 1647 as an appendix to the Méditations mé-
thaphysiques. Descartes argued that it was impossible that 
God could alter eternal mathematical truths, and, there-
fore, that these were absolutely necessary. On his side, 
Gassendi took the consequences of God’s “omnipotence” 
to its extreme: nature and its laws depend on God, and, 
therefore, he can alter them at any time (Osler, 1997). 
Lopes da Veiga seems to be closer to Descartes; this would 
explain, in addition, his own concept of mathematics as 
eternal truth, and of the necessity of the world. This leaves 
him in a religiously ambiguous position: he sets up de fac-
to a separation between the worlds of reason and theology, 
but at the same time seems to believe in the radical neces-
sity of the natural world.
INTERIORITY AND SUBjECTIVITY
What type of subject is the Lone Man at Court, retired 
from the world, living his truth at the margins of common 
opinion, yet conforming to the social institutions which 
he internally mocks? He is not, of course, the Lone Man 
of the Village portrayed by Antonio de Guevara, but nei-
ther is he the retired, spiritual contemplative — the sort of 
person from whom Lopes da Veiga explicitly detaches 
himself (Lopes da Veiga, 1935: 14). There exists a type of 
strangeness or marginality that has often been identified 
in Spanish historiography with the marrano, as Miriam 
Bodian argues in her article in this same monograph. In 
the end, the marrano’s experience was one of distance 
between exterior and interior, between practice and be-
lief. From this point of view, it has been possible to see 
marranismo as a radical experience of “unbelonging”, 
exemplified in personalities like Spinoza, whose “marra-
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no subjectivity” and experience of not belonging either to 
the Jewish or the Christian world assumed, in its political 
expression, a democratic form (in contrast to Hobbes’s 
Leviathan) that “destroyed the imperial foundations of 
Europe” (Villacañas, 2012). Nevertheless, it could be 
problematic to use the category of marrano in this sense, 
because it appears to create a link between political forms 
of not belonging and an ethnic identity. On the other 
hand, it is possible to reflect on the intellectual conse-
quences of mass conversions in a society like Spain’s 
when it comes to defining and conceptualizing forms of 
skepticism that, one way or another, were being produced 
and constructed throughout Europe in an era of dissimu-
lation and of the experience of interchangeable identities 
under the appearance of confessional belonging. In large 
measure, as Foucault recalled, the problem of the “sub-
ject” in Early Modern Europe can be formulated as the 
problem of how to “make oneself a religious subject 
without mediation” (Libera, 2015: 19).
It is true that António Lopes da Veiga was accused of 
being a judaiser: for example, in some of the Conde de Vil-
lamediana’s poems (Sánchez, 1961: 132-134, Acquier, 
2000: 87). Although some credit may have been given to 
Lopes da Veiga’s possible Jewish origins, this accusation re-
ally must be understood in the wider context of the Portu-
guese nation’s history in Spain during this crucial period 
(Bouza, 2000) — a context that makes Lopes da Veiga’s 
courtly career even more singular, and that constitutes a 
fundamental fact for his moral thought and the defining of 
his “disenchantment”. This tension between the constitution 
of a social subject and the consolidation of modern political 
institutions has been understood in self-fashioning terms in 
studies about, for example, Galileo in his courtly career (Bi-
agioli, 2008). For all their differences, the cases of Galileo 
and Lopes da Veiga reveal the fundamental role of the court 
for understanding the civilizing process and the establish-
ment of disciplining mechanisms in Modern Europe.
Naturally, the hypertrophy of the problem of “con-
science”, with all its categories (doubtful, opinionated...), 
in moral literature can be linked to this disciplining pro-
cess, which reflects the deep unity between a moral issue, 
on the one hand, and an epistemological one on the other. 
One word — “probable” — can help us to understand the 
essential unity of this epistemological-moral problem. 
Studies of the conscience, foundational for casuistry, ex-
pressed the need to apprehend the complexity of the mor-
al world, and to attempt to submit the “conscience” to 
some authority in times of a crisis for dogmatism (Río 
Parra, 2008). It was not mere chance that the old category 
of the “doubtful conscience” grew and extended itself un-
til occupying a central space in the world of moral proba-
bility, as in the case of Juan Caramuel, the prince of prob-
abilists. This doubt is precisely what allowed for the 
appearance on the scene of forms of mediation, spiritual 
guidance, and religious authority.
The purely epistemological dimension of this moral 
problem comes into view when one tries to reflect on the 
problem of continuity between the natural and political 
worlds. Can human institutions and human history be the 
objects of scientific knowledge? Can propositions of uni-
versal value be established regarding human actions? Can 
universal moral or legal norms be established? Questions 
like these mark out the borders of a wide but crucial field. 
It is enough to remember the Foucaultian model, accord-
ing to which the constituting of the modern European 
subject is parallel to the constituting of humanity as an 
object of knowledge. As we have seen, some, like Lopes 
da Veiga, established a net separation between the natural 
and the political worlds. Hobbes theorized, for example, 
about what type of scientific knowledge justified the de-
velopment of a science of political rights and obligations, 
and about whether this type of science was the same as 
the one used to know the physical world. Even if Hob-
bes’s solution to this problem of two types of science was 
unsatisfactory (Malcolm, 2002), there remains the ques-
tion of the relationship between the definition of human 
passions and the possibility of thinking about a political 
subject. Lopes da Veiga’s political subject — about which 
it is impossible to make any kind of universal judgement 
except his own evil — is definable only on the basis of 
complete conformity to the established order, not from 
any concept of justice or of a social contract. Here Lopes 
da Veiga’s radical skepticism demonstrates its radical po-
litical conformism as well.
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NOTES
1 On the nature of Modernity as experience and interpretation 
see: Wagner (2008). 
2 See also the contribution of Moshe Sluhovsky in this special 
issue. 
3 “An exemplary linking of the revival of classical learning, the 
Protestant reformation and the rise of the new philosophy as 
stages in the liberation of the inquiring mind was set out in the 
Dictionnaire historique (1697) by Pierre Bayle” (Crombie, 
1996: 36). For a continuation of this genealogy in current litera-
ture see Seigel (2005). 
4 See Miriam Bodian’s contribution to this special issue. 
5 “I think it is important to see traces of the revival of ancient 
scepticism first in Spain before anywhere else in Europe, and 
possibly to link this with the intellectual crises occurring in late 
15th-century Spain with the Conquest of Granada, the Expulsion 
of the Jews from Spain, the development of anti-Trinitarism in 
Spain, and the development of anti-rationalist Spanish mysti-
cism” (Popkin, 1999: xxviii) 
6 In this regard, it is important also to consider that those parallel 
responses shared a common tension between literal and alle-
gorical interpretations (Shalev, 2012: 54)
7 In Ditchfield words: “Confessionalization and extra-European 
colonization should be seen essentially as (parallel) functions of 
modernization” (Ditchfield, 2013: 26). See also Alaoui (2006). 
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8 “el juizio libre […] mal se acomoda a discurrir por fe en las co-
sas humanas, i sólo la mayor probabilidad, hallada por sus mis-
mas especulaciones, le podrá, en lo ambiguo, hazer parcial des-
ta o aquella resolución”.
9 “sólo al provecho propio i al daño ageno “.
10 “todo se nota. Todo se advierte. Todo se malicia”.
11 “no hay conversación donde no se alegue como voz de oráculo 
lo que dixo aquel su sabio, donde no se prueve lo de que se 
habla con que el tal lo dixo”.
12 “I no cae debaxo del género de lisonja el confesar en los térmi-
nos políticos lo que la ley política pudo conceder en orden al 
buen govierno. De forma que en el interior se deve reír, con la 
ley natural que iguala a todos, i acomodarse el exterior a la civil 
que constituye las diferencias. I viene esta distinción a ser ver-
dad, assí lo que se siente, como lo que se manifiesta, aunque 
acciones al parecer entre sí contrarias”.
13 “I en quanto a los otros advertid que como en la Religión ay dos 
especies de culto, interior el uno i el otro exterior, ay también 
en los respetos i veneraciones humanas la misma división. La 
interior veneración bien confieso que sólo a la virtud, o intelec-
tual o moral, la debe el sabio. Pero a la exterior, como sea mo-
derada (supuesta la costumbre del mundo, que vos solo no 
bastaréis a corregir) os obligan la vida civil i la necesidad de 
conservaros”
14 “el gobierno político o el estilo de cada provincia […] pero 
siempre el cuerdo i desengañado debe reservar, dentro de sí, el 
conocimiento recto de la verdad del ser de cada uno”.
15 “tan gloriosa, según la razón política, es, según la natural, una 
brutalidad indigna de hombres. I el valor militar, según la mis-
ma, se deva antes llamar fiereza que valor”.
16 “no contentándose con sujetar los cuerpos de los súbditos, se ha 
estendido a querer subordinar también los entendimientos i a 
persuadirnos que no sólo los devemos obedecer i servir con los 
miembros, mas aun con la razón, dando a todas sus determina-
ciones el mismo crédito que a las divinas, i con repugnancia 
muchas vezes d’éstas i de la ley natural en que se fundan”.
17 “en las controversias no hay medio más apropósito que el ha-
zerse temido, ya sea por la opinión de la suficiencia, ya por la 
azedía de las respuestas, ya por la desestimación de las objeccio-
nes [sic]”.
18 “personas tenidas de todos los que las comunican por oráculos, 
no más de porque resuelven con confiança i tratan con menos-
precio al que las contradize”.
19 “los ordinarios concursos, juntas, academias i congregaciones 
cortesanas”.
20 “juntas de diversas jerarchías de entendidos, no todos cultiva-
dos con estudios, sino mezcla de zánganos i de abejas; de legos, 
que llaman de buena razón, y de noticiosos […]”.
21 “aprenden allí unos principios, que les estuviera mejor nunca 
haverlos oído, i con ellos entran intrépidamente por todas las 
materias que se proponen”.
22 “que oyen i callan si se altercan puntos de ciencia”.
23 “la zumba i la chança, compuesta, las más vezes, de la cabriola 
del equívoco”.
24 “pasan a determinar como de fe qualquiera proposición suya i a 
condenar como heréticas las de los otros”.
25 “vozería y confusión babilónica”.
26 “la ostentación de superioridad, o en los estudios o en el inge-
nio”. On the topos of criticism of literary academies (King, 
1963: 99-101).
27 “¿qué plaças o qué oficios se han proveído o se esperan proveer 
de nuevo?, ¿quáles, entre los del gobierno público, tengan 
mayores preeminencias i sean más dignos de ser apetecidos?, 
¿qué estilos se observen en los tribunales?”.
28 “como las questiones que suelen venir a plática son más común-
mente de facultades en que no hay demonstración mathemática, 
nunca le falta al ingenioso por donde escaparse, i aun instar 
contra las conclusiones más admitidas de los doctos”.
29 “El especular los secretos de Naturaleza, las Causas i Efetos de 
todo lo que contiene el Universo, en quanto curiosidad del En-
tendimiento i exercicio del Ingenio, no puede negarse que es 
loable; pero hazerlo ocupación principal, estimarse i desvane-
cerse por ella, supuesta la incerteza de quanto se resuelve, i la 
poca utilidad que de semejante Estudio se sigue, no sólo tengo 
por indigno de alabança, mas a qualquiera luz que le mire, por 
instituto indignísimo de risa”.
30 “yo llamo sabio, no al más especulado, sino al que sabe lo que 
más puede aprovecharle”.
31 “saber los defetos de los linages agenos” or “consolar los del pro-
pio”. Once again, we can interpret this phrase in the light of 
Lopes da Veiga’s work as secretary to Bernardino Fernández de 
Velasco, and to the way that history was principally used in noble 
houses, to legitimise the record of the lineage — a use that could 
be at odds with other historiographical practices (Jular, 2014).
32 An argument that is only valid for human history, not for sacred 
history or the holy fathers.
33 “aun abstrayendo de la verdad o mentira de las relaciones”.
34 “pompa vana, quando no sea de maligna curiosidad”.
35 “arrogante turba de Gramáticos y Críticos […] ignorante cana-
lla i hezes […] de los literarios”.
36 “sobre letras, sílabas i dicciones, sin las quales no se puede es-
cribir ni hablar, con poder para calumniar o aprobar, si no los 
concetos, las imágenes i expressión dellos, i para suplir o emen-
dar los textos más auténticos”.
37 “incapaz de penetrar lo interior de la Sabiduría”.
38 “el imperio sobre las exterioridades”.
39 “las significaciones de los vocablos, la pronunciación i acentos 
de las dicciones, los espacios de las sílabas, asonancias i diso-
nancias, aspereza i blandura de las letras”.
40 “profesión de principiantes perpetuos”.
41 “fixos i permanentes a la entrada de la puerta del saber”.
42 “disputar i reconocer lo íntimo de las sentencias, questiones i 
discursos científicos”.
43 “emendar corrupciones de vocablos, alterar colocaciones, apro-
bar o reprobar lecciones de lugares” son tareas “que no salen 
del distrito de las palabras”.
44 “desnaturalizando el ser y calidades de cada cosa, i haziendo 
que el objeto sea instrumento, i el instrumento objeto”.
45 “Dos Filósofos Estoikos presento á V.E. en lengua Kastellana, 
tan axustados en librea de palabras i ortografía, komo ellos lo 
fueron en sus razones y kostumbres. El esterior por mi parte es 
éste, lo interior dizen sus eskritos [...]. Van alegres kon el traxe i 
ropa frugal i senzilla, komo fue su vida”.
46 “tan contrarios de todo género de Fe, que aun a la Divina no 
conceden más que las apariencias inescusables a su conserva-
ción […]. Con los mismos ojos con que miran las cosas terres-
tres, quieren divisar las superiores”.
47 “goviernan sin ser governadores”.
48 “i, según está el mundo, os digo que menos disgustos se le oca-
sionan por el camino de ocultar los senos del propio pecho i es-
cudriñar los del ageno, que por essotro de fiar a la contingencia 
de algún mal trato los tesoros de su secreto, i trasladar a lo pa-
tente de las palabras el coraçón, que la próvida Naturaleza es-
condió a los sentidos”
49 “el hechizo de los beneficios i buena correspondencia”.
50 “Pero como esta legalidad la guisa i acomoda cada Nación i 
cada Reyno, según la capacidad o capricho de sus Legisladores, 
sucede que no todas las Naciones aciertan a tener la que con-
viene. I una vez tomado el curso i adquirido hábito en el yerro, 
por más que después descubran las experiencias i publiquen a 
vozes los inconvenientes, o porque los domestica la costumbre, 
o porque los haze como Religiosos la veneración de los Pasa-
dos, que los aprobaron, o porque se les representa horrible a los 
presentes el alterar lo envejecido, vienen a pasar plaça de for-
çosos i a ser tolerados como inescusables o invencibles”.
51 “confusión mayor de la Ciencia”.
52 “[…] porque no se le escondan i tenga principios por donde 
conjeturar las segundas intenciones que en todos los tratos i co-
municaciones puede aver, i desviar o prevenir las malicias de 
los que tratare, que si no el fiarse de nadie es de Ánimo malig-
no, el asegurarse de todos parecerá de Simple. I es necesario 
conocer por Arte hasta dónde suele estenderse la Maldad Hu-
mana, i enterarse de cómo en el Mundo se procede, para no 
perecer miserablemente a manos de los engaños que se usan”.
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53 “mal puede sentir su ruina el que no la tiene por tal, i mal desa-
zonarse con representación alguna de la gravedad de la mental 
Blasfemia el que no reconoce Soberano Sujeto de quien blasfe-
mar […]. A nadie perturba lo que no cree”.
54 “temor alguno de la Primera Causa”.
55 “sólo a las Segundas Causas conocen por principio i fin, circu-
larmente incesable, de todo lo Criado”.
56 “los doctísimos varones, […] cuya profesión es el tratarlo[…]”.
57 sino “a puros indicios de Razón i conjeturas prudenciales”.
58 “que tengan las repúblicas, los ministros i los príncipes poder i 
autoridad de la naturaleza o de su Autor para calificar i diferen-
ciar la sangre (cosa que, apurándola bien, ni la misma natu-
raleza, ni aun toda la omnipotencia de su Autor, la puede hazer 
sin diferenciar la especie)”.
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